The IEC61508 Maintenance and Service Engineer's hymn sheet

A few key points for those maintenance and service engineers undertaking work under the IEC61508 group of standards

by the 61508 Association

SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS are too important to leave to chance!

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Important and surprising fact number 1

A SIL 3 safety loop means that without that one loop functioning correctly the risk of fatality* is more than 1000 times the wrong side of tolerable.

A SIL 2 safety loop means that without that one loop functioning the risk of fatality* is more than 100 times the wrong side of tolerable.

A SIL 1 safety loop means that without that one loop functioning the risk of fatality* is more than 10 times the wrong side of tolerable.

We suggest that you don't even think about SIL 4!

*That is if the SIL loop has been provided for protection of people. The SIL loop may have been provided for environmental or asset protection.
SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS are too important to leave to chance!

Maintenance and proof testing of safety instrumented systems are not just important they are ESSENTIAL. Maintenance and proof testing is a specific part of the safety loop lifecycle in the standard.

The proof testing is to reassure EVERYONE that the loop works correctly and will save lives*

Keep your records of testing and maintenance up to date and document everything

*That is if the SIL loop has been provided for protection of people. The SIL loop may have been provided for environmental or asset protection.

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Important and surprising fact number 2

A certified claim that a component is “SIL 2” (or any other SIL number) does NOT mean that it is suitable for use in your “SIL 2” safety loop.

... The SIL number does not apply to the components in isolation

... The SIL rating applies to the whole loop and NOT just the individual components in the loop

... The loop architecture also plays a part in the reliability required of an individual component

... It is NOT at all unusual to find that a collection of “SIL 3” parts put together in a loop only achieve SIL 1 or SIL 2 ... and the SIL rating is a safety LOOP value not a component value
Important and surprising fact number 3

Every component in the loop needs to provide sufficient reliability so that the loop achieves the SIL rated integrity

... This means that the valve, pump or end device that takes the ultimate action to maintain safety is INCLUDED.

... It is NOT enough to simply use a SIL certified PLC and connect all the loops into that.

... It is NOT enough to get a SIL certified PLC and a certified transmitter and ignore the other parts of the safety loop.
You can't replace one certified component with another certified component from a different manufacturer even if they are both certified to the same “level”

You can't even replace a component with one of a different version or model ... when you replace a component in the loop you must replace LIKE FOR LIKE ... same component model, same model number, same firmware revision etc

The reliability required to perform correctly in the safety loop is a combination of factors that include the maintenance and proof testing of the component.

The component from a different manufacturer will be expected to achieve reliabilities in the same range but with DIFFERENT maintenance and proof-testing requirements.

If you substitute a component with one from a different manufacturer then you are affecting the maintenance and proof-testing requirements for the entire loop and the whole loop design must be referred back to the designer.
Overides and “jumpers” are not to be used

The use of overrides and “jumpers” under the standard is highly exceptional

Overides and jumpers are disabling, or at least, restricting the operation of the safety loop and yet your safety is dependant on that safety loop (see fact 1).

The use of overrides and jumpers, if they are used at all, must be very strictly controlled, managed and monitored.
Important and surprising fact number 5

IEC 61508 group of standards does NOT require certification for components. It does require proof of dependability and suitability for the application.

A certificate alone is NOT proof of dependability and suitability for the application.

...The report behind the certificate gives the designer of the safety loop the reliability data needed to design the loop.

...The report needs to show how the data was generated.

...The report needs to show the limits of applicability for the data.

...The report needs to show restrictions and conditions of use.
The report that gives the reliability data for the component is the ESSENTIAL information that the designer needs to design the safety loop.

The safety loop designer CANNOT design the safety loop without the reliability data.

... A certificate without the report giving the data is useless to the loop designer.

... A certificate without the reliability data and the basis of the assessment is a waste of paper.

... If you don't have the report then you can't use the component.
Important and surprising fact number 6 continued...

The report that gives the reliability data for the component is the ESSENTIAL information that the designer needs to design the safety loop.

The safety loop designer CANNOT design the safety loop without the reliability data.

... The report should show the assumptions made and the basis of the reliability assessment as well as the scope and limitations of use (it is not unusual to find that the component's reliability assessment only covers electronic hardware and not the process interface!)

... The report should show the techniques of assessment and not just a bland statement that “it was assessed”. The techniques used are a real part of what demonstrates that the reliability evidence is appropriate for the application.
“Proven in use” or “Prior use” claims require substantial evidence and cannot easily be used. 

... ONLY the end user can offer a “Proven in use” or “Prior use” claim as evidence of suitability in a safety instrumented system (and they need substantial valid evidence of previous use in the same application complete with failure records and safety management amongst other requirements) 

... A salesperson or supplier cannot offer you “Proven in use” or “prior use” as evidence of a SIL rating claim 

... See the 61508 Association statement on “Proven in use” and “Prior use” claims
Important and surprising fact number 8

The IEC61508 group of standards require that everyone involved in the safety system, including suppliers and sub-contractors, demonstrate “Functional Safety Management”

... so certification of Functional Safety Management, or other appropriate proof, is the FIRST thing a purchaser should ask for.

... interestingly, certificates for components are NOT required under the standard (but they might be appropriate for your project).

... so don't make the mistake of asking for certificates for equipment (the bit that isn't demanded) when you've forgotten to ask for proof of Functional Safety Management (the bit that IS demanded).
Important and surprising fact number 9

The IEC61508 group of standards require that everyone involved, including your suppliers and sub-contractors, demonstrate “Functional Safety Management”

... IEC61508 Part 1 Clause 6

... matching requirements appear in the sector specific guidance standards (For example: IEC61511 Part 1 Clause 5)

... Regulators are requiring that safety management is properly covered (See the HSE guidance - “Managing Competence for Safety Related Systems” July 2007)

http://www.hse.gov.uk/consult/condocs/competence.htm

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The presence of a certified expert is NOT proof of “Functional Safety Management”

... The functional safety management will review the competencies of everyone involved and it identifies those who require particular expertise. Thus the use of a functional safety expert may sometimes be appropriate as a decision that comes out of a contractor's or supplier's Functional Safety Management, but it is NOT a substitute for Functional Safety Management

... Functional Safety Management covers EVERBODY involved

... not just the expert

... not just the technician

... it involves everybody involved with the safety system (including you, doing the testing and the maintenance!)
Important and surprising fact number 11

The part of a safety instrumented system that is most likely to fail is ... the people (see fact numbers 8 and 9)

• Almost everyone will choose a certified PLC
  • *usually the MOST reliable part of the loop even without a certificate*
• A lot of people will ask for a certified transmitter
  • *less reliable than the PLC but usually robust*
• Some people will ask for a certificate with the valve
  • ... *an unreliable part of the loop*
• Too many people fail to ask for the safety report
  —... *the bit that is ESSENTIAL for the design* (they went away surprisingly happy with a certificate!)

• Hardly anyone asks about the people
  —... *the LEAST reliable part* (the part covered by *Functional Safety Management*)
Your guide for purchasing parts and services

• Proof testing and maintenance of SIL rated loops is **ESSENTIAL** (keep your records up to date and document everything)

• The SIL applies to the whole loop – **NOT just to the components**

• Don't replace a component in the loop with a different model even if it seems to be compatible (you will be messing up the proof-testing and maintenance requirements designed into the loop)

• Don't buy components without the report (or equivalent) giving the evidence of reliability and all the associated conditions even if it does have a certificate

• Ask for evidence of Functional Safety Management (meeting the requirements of IEC61508 part 1 clause 6 or its matching requirements under the sector standards)